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unconvincing, stated that the "retraction inculpated... [the defendant] to the same extent that it exculpated . . ." the witness. 206 The
Court rejected the idea that the right of confrontation in a criminal
trial can be governed by such an "unrealistic definition of the word
'against.' "207
It is submitted that if the New York courts apply the "affirmative damage" rule of Fitzpatrick in a mechanical manner they may
well run afoul of the Chambers decision. Such questions, however,
will be definitively answered only in subsequent cases.
DEVELOPMENTS IN NEW YORK PRACTICE

Landowners held to single duty of reasonable care towards all entrants.
Through a series of cases decided over the course of the past
century, common law courts developed a complex system whereby
the degree of duty owed by a landowner 20 8 to a person upon his
premises varied with the classification of that person. 20 9 At common law, a trespasser was one who entered or remained upon the
premises without privilege or the consent of the owner. 2 10 To him
the occupier owed only the slight duty to refrain from inflicting
wanton or wilful injury.2 1 ' In contrast, a licensee was defined as
206

Id. at 297.
20 Id. at 298. See United States v. Norman, 518 F.2d 1176 (4th Cir. 1975) (a party does
not "vouch" for the testimony of his witnesses); United States v. Perez, 493 F.2d 1339 (10th
Cir. 1974) (denial of right of confrontation to permit government agent to testify as to what
an informer told him without producing the informer at trial).
208 Although considerable legal differences may exist between the status of land owner
and land occupier, for the purposes of this Survey the terms are used interchangeably to
denote one in control of real property.
209See, e.g., Haefeli v. Woodrich Eng'r Co., 255 N.Y. 442, 175 N.E. 123 (1931); Vaughan
v. Transit Dev. Co., 222 N.Y. 79, 118 N.E. 219 (1917); Indermaur v. Dames, L.R. 1
C.P. 274 (1866), aff'd, L.R. 2 C.P. 311 (Ex. 1867). See also W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE
LAW OF TORTS 351-415 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER]; Marsh, The History and
Comparative Law of Invitees, Licensees and Trespassers, 69 L.Q. REV. 182 (1953) [hereinafter
cited as Marsh].
210 Vaughan v. Transit Dev. Co., 222 N.Y. 79, 118 N.E. 219 (1917); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 329 (1965). Consent may be implied when a landowner has knowledge
that persons enter and use a particular area in substantial numbers. Such persons are then
treated as licensees. Id. § 330.
211 Mendelowitz v. Neisner, 258 N.Y. 181, 179 N.E. 378 (1932); Marsh, supra note 209,
at 187. An early exception to the rule equated the setting of a spring-gun to trap a trespasser
with the intentional infliction of injury. Bird v. Holbrook, 130 Eng. Rep. 911 (C.P. 1828).
New York courts have expanded the notion of trap to include deceptively innocent, artificially created dangerous conditions in the land. Mayer v. Temple Props., Inc., 307 N.Y.
559, 122 N.E.2d 909 (1954) (55-foot-deep hole covered with flimsy piece of wood). The
concept of trap also includes the negligent control of a dangerous instrumentality. Kingsland
v. Erie County Agricultural Soc'y, 298 N.Y. 409, 84 N.E.2d 38 (1949) (fireworks). Another
early exception to the rule prohibiting recovery for injuries sustained by trespassers can be
found in Barnes v. Ward, 137 Eng. Rep. 945 (C.P. 1850), wherein the court held an
unfenced excavation on the side of a road to be a nuisance, for which the occupier would be
liable to anyone injured by it. Another exception differentiated between discovered and
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one who entered or remained on the premises for his own purposes, with the owner's permission, either express or implied, but
without invitation.2" Here, the law imposed a broader duty on the
owner, requiring him to refrain from acts of "affirmative negligence" 213 and to disclose dangerous conditions known to the owner
and unlikely to be discovered by the licensee. 2 14 Finally, an invitee
was defined as one who entered either in connection with the
business of the owner2 1 5 or under an implied invitation to the
public to enter for the purpose for which the premises were held
undiscovered trespassers, with New York courts holding that the occupier may not use
unreasonable force to expel a discovered trespasser. Ansteth v. Buffalo Ry., 145 N.Y. 210,
39 N.E. 708 (1895). Furthermore, the discovered trespasser may not be injured recklessly or
negligently by an act directed towards him. Magar v. Hammond, 183 N.Y. 387, 76 N.E. 474
(1906). An important exception has also been created to account for the cases of child
trespassers who are foreseeably attracted to the accessible property by some artificial condition which the child does not fully comprehend, or which is highly dangerous. Sioux City &
Pac. R.R. v. Stout, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 657 (1874); Patterson v. Proctor Paint & Varnish Co.,
21 N.Y.2d 447, 235 N.E.2d 765, 288 N.Y.S.2d 622 (1968).
212 Vaughan v. Transit Dev. Co., 222 N.Y. 79, 118 N.E. 219 (1917); Meyer v. Manzer,
179 Misc. 355, 39 N.Y.S.2d 5 (Sup. Ct. Oneida County 1943). Among the persons classified
as licensees are servants, Priestly v. Fowler, [1837]All E.R. 449 (Ex.), guests of the household,
Southcote v. Stanley, 156 Eng. Rep. 1195 (Ex. 1856), employees whose assumption of danger
is bargained for, Indermaur v. Dames, L.R. 1 C.P. 274 (1866), aff'd, L.R. 2 C.P. 311 (Ex.
1867), and persons using the property with permission but for their own convenience,
Sutton v. New York Cent. & Hudson River R.R., 66 N.Y. 243 (1876). There has been a
recent trend toward treating social guests as invitees rather than licensees. See, e.g., CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-557a (Supp. 1975); Alexander v. General Accident Fire & Life
Assurance Corp., 98 So. 2d 730 (La. App. 1957). See also Mounsey v. Ellard, 363 Mass. 693,
297 N.E.2d 43 (1973) (abolishing distinction between invitees and licensees).
213 See, e.g., Corby v. Hill, 140 Eng. Rep. 1209 (C.P. 1858). Compare Nicholson v. Erie
Ry., 41 N.Y. 525 (1870) (licensee injured by rolling car cannot recover since failure to set
brakes on railroad car is passive negligence), with Barry v. New York Cent. & Hudson River
R.R., 92 N.Y. 289 (1883) (when operating train, one must exercise reasonable care to avoid
injuring licensee). Deficient maintenance of a machine or structure was considered passive
negligence and did not provide a basis of recovery by a licensee. See, e.g., Cusick v. Adams,
115 N.Y. 55, 21 N.E. 673 (1889) (hole in private bridge); Larmore v. Crown Point Iron Co.,
101 N.Y. 391, 4 N.E. 752 (1886) (defective machine); Southcote v. Stanley, 156 Eng. Rep.
1195 (Ex. 1856) (defective glass door).
214 The requirement that the landowner must disclose the existence of dangerous
hidden defects is an expansion of the trap exception discussed in note 211 supra. 33 ALBANY
L. REV. 230, 234 (1968). There is no duty to warn of patent defects which are already known
to the licensee or could be discovered with reasonable care. Compare Sardo v. Lascalza, 236
N.Y.S.2d 650 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1962) (duty not to direct guest into unlighted area
without warning of known dangers), with Kreger v. Ladd, 30 Misc. 2d 736, 216 N.Y.S.2d 866
(Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1961) (no duty to warn guest of defective metal stripping at exit
door which was lighted and visible). See also Velez v. City of New York, 45 App. Div. 2d 887,
358 N.Y.S.2d 18 (2d Dep't 1974); Hirschman v. Hirschman, 4 App. Div. 2d 630, 168
N.Y.S.2d 153 (1st Dep't 1957).
21'See, e.g., Haefeli v. Woodrich Eng'r Co., 255 N.Y. 442, 175 N.E. 123 (1931); Vaughan v. Transit Dev. Co., 222 N.Y. 79, 118 N.E. 219 (1917). Early invitees included the user
of a boat canal, Parnaby v. Lancaster Canal Co., 113 Eng. Rep. 400, 408 (Ex. 1839), and an
independent contractor, Indermaur v. Dames, L.R. I C.P. 274 (1866), aff'd, L.R. 2 C.P. 311
(Ex. 1867). The invitee classification has since been expanded to situations providing only
tenuous economic benefit to the occupier. See, e.g., Hickey v. Shoemaker, 132 Ind. App. 136,
167 N.E.2d 487 (1960) (viewing body in funeral home); Powell v. Great Lakes Transit Corp.,
152 Minn. 90, 188 N.W. 61 (1922) (seeing passenger off aboard a boat).
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open.2 1 6 Because the invitee's entry in most cases was both highly
predictable and beneficial to the occupier, courts imposed a duty of
reasonable care, requiring that the owner make the premises
2 17
safe.
In the recent case of Basso v. Miller,218 New York joined the
ranks of a small but growing number of jurisdictions that have
abandoned these traditional common law classifications. 219 The
Court of Appeals, in a decision written by Judge Cooke, has
adopted a single standard of care applicable whenever a party
enters a landowner's premises, viz., reasonable care under the circumstances. Thus, the landowner's liability to any person injured
on his premises will now be based upon the foreseeability of the
injured person's presence at the place of injury, regardless of that
person's status under the common law. Among the circumstances
to be considered are "the likelihood of injury to others, the seri220
ousness of the injury, and the burden of avoiding the risk.
2'6 See, e.g., Caldwell v. Village of Island Park, 304 N.Y. 268, 107 N.E.2d 441 (1952)
(using village park); Abbott v. New York Pub. Library, 263 App. Div. 314, 32 N.Y.S.2d 963
(1st Dep't 1942) (using public library); Guilford v. Yale Univ., 128 Conn. 449, 23 A.2d 917
(1942) (attending college reunion); Geiger v. Simpson Methodist-Episcopal Church, 174
Minn. 389, 219 N.W. 463 (1928) (attending church service). In these cases liability is
predicated on the implicit representation that reasonable care has been exercised to make
the premises safe. PROSSER, supra note 209, at 388.
217 The owner owed to invitees the duty to inspect the premises, remedy defects, and
warn of potential hazards. See, e.g., Indermaur v. Dames, L.R. I C.P. 274, 288 (1866), aff'd,
L.R. 2 C.P. 311 (Ex. 1867) (failure to warn contractor of open shaft); Parnaby v. Lancaster
Canal Co., 113 Eng. Rep. 400 (Ex. 1839) (failure of canal operator to remove sunken wreck
or mark its location). See also McNally v. Oakwood, 210 App. Div. 612, 206 N.Y.S. 759 (4th
Dep't 1924), aff'd, 240 N.Y. 600, 148 N.E. 722 (1925); Lindsley v. Stern, 203 App. Div. 615,
197 N.Y.S. 106 (1st Dep't 1922). Although bound to exercise reasonable care for their
protection, the occupier is not an insurer of an invitee's safety. Thus, where a risk could not
be anticipated or where the invitee had knowledge of the danger, the occupier is not liable.
Powers v. Montgomery Ward Co., 251 App. Div. 120, 295 N.Y.S. 712 (4th Dep't), aff'd, 276
N.Y. 600, 12 N.E.2d 595 (1937); PROSSER, supra note 209, at 392-93. In New York, persons
accompanying invitees, such as children or spouses, will be treated as invitees. Davis v. Ferris,
29 App. Div. 623, 53 N.Y.S. 571 (2d Dep't 1898).
218 40 N.Y.2d 233, 352 N.E.2d 868, 386 N.Y.S.2d 564 (1976).
219 E.g., Smith v. Arbaugh's Restaurant, Inc., 469 F.2d 97 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied,
412 U.S. 939 (1973); Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 443 P.2d 561, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97
(1968); Mile High Fence Co. v. Radovich, 175 Colo. 537, 489 P.2d 308 (1971); Pickard v.
Honolulu, 51 Hawaii 134, 452 P.2d 445 (1969); Sargent v. Ross, 113 N.H. 388, 308 A.2d 528
(1973); Mariorenzi v. DiPonte, Inc., 114 R.I. 294, 333 A.2d 127 (1975). Courts in several
other jurisdictions have questioned the common law categories without overruling them.
E.g., Boyer v. Guidicy Marble, Terrazo & Tile Co., 246 S.W.2d 742, 748 (Mo. 1952); Taylor
v. New Jersey Highway Auth., 22 N.J. 454, 126 A.2d 313 (1956); Potts v. Amis, 62 Wash. 2d
777, 384 P.2d 825 (1963).
220 40 N.Y.2d at 241, 352 N.E.2d at 872, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 568, quoting Smith v. Arbaugh's Restaurant, Inc., 469 F.2d 97, 100 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 939 (1973).
The California Supreme Court has also suggested that consideration be given to the moral
blame connected with the conduct, the connection between injury and conduct, the policy of
preventing future harm, and the prevalence and availability of insurance. Rowland v.
Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 443 P.2d 561, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1968).
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The Basso plaintiff was a passenger on a motorcycle driven by
William Miller. The two were returning from a rescue operation on
the grounds of Ice Cave Mountains, a scenic park. As they rounded
a curve on a park road, the motorcycle hit a series of holes and
spun out of control, throwing both driver and plaintiff onto the
rocks. The plaintiff sought to recover damages on the theory that
the defendant park had negligently failed to maintain its road in a
safe condition. Highly conflicting testimony was offered at the trial
as to the circumstances under which the plaintiff had entered and
remained upon the property.'2 1 A serious dispute arose, therefore,
as to the plaintiff's actual status and the degree of care owed him
by the park.2 2 2
In the majority's view, the conflict of evidence made it clear
that a person's status often does not fit neatly into one of the three
common law categories. In the instant case, it was possible "to have
labeled the plaintiff a trespasser when he entered without permission . . . a licensee when seen but not ejected . . . and an invitee
when assisting in the rescue. 22 3 Rather than attempting to fit the
plaintiff into a traditional category, the majority paused to reflect
on the origin of these rules. The Court found the common law
distinctions to be rooted in the law's feudal and agrarian heritage,
and no longer applicable in a society in which human safety is
emphasized to a greater extent than is the unfettered use of private
property. 224 Furthermore, as the Court indicated in Scurti v. City of
221 Testimony differed concerning whether Basso had a season's pass to use defendant's
property, whether the gate was open when the plaintiff first entered the property to assist in
the rescue, whether he had been told by an attendant not to enter, whether he was told to
leave, and whether he actually assisted in the rescue or merely stood by and watched. 40
N.Y.2d at 235-37, 352 N.E.2d at 869-70, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 564-66.
222 Over defendant's objection, the trial judge erroneously instructed the jury that the
defendant had a duty to warn plaintiff of defects in the road if they found plaintiff to be a
Id. at 239, 352 N.E.2d at 871, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 567.
licensee.
2 23
Id at 239-40, 352 N.E.2d at 871, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 567; accord, Dunster v. Abbott,
[1953] 2 All E.R. 1572 (C.A.).
224 40 N.Y.2d at 240, 352 N.E.2d at 871-72, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 567. The classification
system antedates current negligence theory. Marsh, supra note 209, at 184. It was thought
overly burdensome to force landowners to restrict the full development of the land by taking
safety precautions or avoiding dangerous activities. See Hughes, Duties to Trespassers: A
Comparative Study and Revaluation, 68 YALE L.J. 633 (1959) [hereinafter cited as Hughes];
PROSSER, supra note 209, at 357-59. But, as Chief Judge Bazelon has noted, "[t]he trespasser
who steps from a public sidewalk onto a private parking lot today is not the 'outlaw' or
'poacher' whose entry was both unanticipated and resented in the nineteenth century."
Smith v. Arbaugh's Restaurant, Inc., 469 F.2d 97, 102 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S.
939 (1973). Moreover, "only an extreme theory of retribution could transform any taint of
illegality into a bar against damages for injury." Hughes, supra at 686. The historical
progression from an agrarian to an urban industrialized society has forced the courts to
develop numerous refinements and exceptions to the classification system. See notes 211-17
supra. The United States Supreme Court has characterized the system as a "semantic morass"
and refused to adopt such standards within the framework of its admiralty jurisdiction.
Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 358 U.S. 625, 630-31 (1959).
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New York, 2 5 a companion case to Basso, the assumptions underlying
the various classifications do not always hold true in particular
factual settings. 22 6' Finally, the Basso Court noted that the amount
of time spent on determining status is often monumental. 22 7 Thus,
the Court ruled that all landowners will henceforth be under a
single duty to use reasonable care based on foreseeability of the
plaintiff's presence, regardless of the injured person's common law
status.228 The Court thereupon remanded the case to the trial

court for reconsideration in light of the new standard of care.
In a separate opinion, Chief Judge Breitel, although concurring in the result, vigorously dissented from the decision to abolish
the common law classifications. 229 The Chief Judge contended that
the result could have been reached within the existing common law
framework. 230 Defending the traditional categories as being valuable for the predictive stability and guidance they offer, he argued
that the majority's substitute was a vague generalization likely to
produce more problems than it would solve. Moreover, the Chief
Judge criticized the majority for surrendering to the sympathies of
the jury the courts' role in applying social policies and determining
231
the existence of a duty.
225 40 N.Y.2d 433, 354 N.E.2d 794, 387 N.Y.S.2d 55 (1976).
22
rId. at 440, 354 N.E.2d at 796, 387 N.Y.S.2d at 58.
227 40 N.Y.2d at 239, 352 N.E.2d at 871, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 567. See note 232 and
accompanying text infra.
228 As Judge Cooke pointed out in Basso, this rule is no different from ordinary
negligence theory, see, e.g., Conway v. O'Brien, 111 F.2d 611, 612 (2d Cir. 1940) (L. Hand,
J.), rev'd on other grounds, 312 U.S. 492 (1941), and the doctrines of comparative negligence
and assumption of risk may be invoked when appropriate. 40 N.Y.2d at 241, 352 N.E.2d at
872, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 568.
229 40 N.Y.2d at 243, 352 N.E.2d at 873, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 569. (Breitel, C.J. & Jasen, J.
concurring).
230
Id., 352 N.E.2d at 874, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 569. In Basso, the Chief Judge suggested that
the plaintiff could have recovered as an invitee. Similarly, in Scurti, he maintained that the
principles applicable to child trespassers and maintenance of public parks could have resolved the case in favor of the plaintiff. 40 N.Y.2d at 443,354 N.E.2d at 798-99,387 N.Y.S.2d at
59.
231 40 N.Y.2d at 243, 352 N.E.2d at 874, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 569-70. As was noted by the
Chief Judge, juries are often overly influenced by emotion. See, e.g., Toomey v. London,
Brighton & S. Coast Ry., 140 Eng. Rep. 694 (C.P. 1857), where the court, holding as a matter
of law that there was no evidence of negligence, declared that "every person who has had
any experience in courts of justice knows very well that a case of this sort against a railway
company could only be submitted to a jury with one result." See also Hardcastle v. South
Yorkshire Ry. & River Dun Co., 157 Eng. Rep. 761, 764 (Ex. 1859), where the court noted
"it would be very dangerous if... in every case [liability] was to be left as a fact to the jury
It is submitted that this concern is inappropriate. Under traditional negligence theory,
the question of duty is ordinarily a preliminary question for the court to decide. Once it is
determined that a duty exists, it is for the jury to determine whether the defendant's specific
conduct has satisfactorily discharged his general duty of care. PROSSER, supra note 209 at
205-08. By basing the existence of a duty on the foreseeability of the plaintiff's presence, the
Chief Judge declared, the question of duty has been transformed into an issue of fact for the
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It is submitted that the rule announced by the Basso Court is a
welcome and laudable one. Most of the 1000-page trial record in
the instant case was developed in an effort to determine plaintiff's
common law status. One direct and positive result of the Basso and
Scurti approaches should be the elimination of such judicial effort
by avoiding the need for a lengthy examination of status. It should
also prevent the numerous appeals resulting from alleged errors in
determining status and in jury instructions concerning the correlative duties owed to different classes of entrants.2 3 2 Concededly, the
number of claims filed may rise as the probable decrease in the
number of complaints summarily dismissed encourages the filing
of suits which previously would not have been brought.2 3 3 Nevertheless, those who fear a sharp increase in liability as a result of
Basso might be comforted by the experience of the State of California, which has used a similar rule for nearly a decade without any
jury in all cases where the plaintiff's presence was not unforeseeable as a matter of law.
Whether this is more than a mere difference of semantics is disputable since, by determining
a plaintiff's status under prior law, the jury would indirectly decide the question of duty. In
cases where the issue of status was submitted to the jury along with the issue of care, this
decision was not as indirect as it might seem. Moreover, as one commentator has declared,
"we must either trust the jury or get rid of it." Hughes, supra note 224, at 700. The Basso
Court properly noted that if occasional damage awards are excessive, or if the plaintiff fails
to submit sufficient evidence to support the existence of every element of a negligence
action, the court must still set aside the verdict as against the weight of the evidence. 40
N.Y.2d at 242, 352 N.E.2d at 873, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 568. Further room for judicial guidance
and supervision will be afforded in the development of appropriate jury instructions.
Indeed, in Smith v. Arbaugh's Restaurant, Inc., 469 F.2d 97 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412
U.S. 939 (1973), Chief Judge Bazelon offered some model jury instructions:
A [landowner] is not an insurer of the condition of his [property]. His duty is to
exercise reasonable care to keep [his property] safe [in view of the foreseeability of
the presence of others on his land]. He is responsible, of course, for injuries
resultingfrom risks created personally or by his employees. Moreover, his obligation of due care extends to reasonable supervision and inspection of the premises to
identify and protect against potential perils [in view of the probability of injury to
others]. For this reason, liability may also spring from a negligent failure to
safeguard against dangers born of the activities of [others]. But negligence can be
found in relation to a [visitor]-created hazard only if it is known, or because of its
duration should have been discovered, in time to afford a fair opportunity to
remove it.
469 F.2d at 106 n.48, quoting Seganish v. District of Columbia Safeway Stores, Inc., 406 F.2d
653, 655-56 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (changes by the court). Landowners should also be entitled to
an instruction to the effect that they are not expected to assume burdens which are
unreasonably expensive and difficult when compared to the probability of harm and seriousness of injury if it happens. 469 F.2d at 106 n.49. Sufficient flexib'ility is also inherent in a
standard of reasonableness to avoid undue harshness to homeowners and apartment dwellers of limited means. Id. at 106. In no case, however, would the occupier be entitled to an
instruction indicating he had no duty to repair, or warn entrants of defects. Fitch v. LeBeau,
1 Cal. App. 3d, 81 Cal. Rptr. 722 (1969).
232 In Mile High Fence Co. v. Radovich, 175 Colo. 537, 489 P.2d 308 (1971), the
Colorado Supreme Court noted that one recent case had been before the court four times
on the issue of status. The Basso appeal also resulted from an erroneous jury instruction on
the question of the appropriate 'duty. See note 222 supra.
23 Cf. 25 VAND. L. R v. 623, 636 (1972).
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apparent major problems.2 3 4 Similarly, the French civil law system
holds landowners to a high degree of responsibility, and yet has not
experienced "incessant verdicts in favor of the plaintiff. 2 35 If, in
fact, insurance rates do rise, the increase might be absorbed by
industrial and commercial concerns.2 3 6 This would be indicative of
Basso and Scurti's most important result -the
partial shifting of
risk by expanding the duty of care on the parties who will, in many
cases, be able to prevent, insure against, and absorb the financial
loss of property-related injuries. Commercial entities can treat such
losses or insurance premiums as a cost of doing business. The
homeowner or apartment dweller of limited means, on the other
hand, may be protected by flexibility in the general standard of
reasonableness, 37 as well as by joint landlord liability. Hopefully,
the increase in potential liability will yield a decrease in future
injuries by placing landowners on notice that they will be held to
reasonable standards of care in the maintenance of their premises. 23 8 The holding of the Court of Appeals in Basso is a welcome
step toward conforming the law to modern socio-economic conditions and demands. Application of a single duty of reasonable care
will simplify litigation in the area of property-related injuries while
shifting liability to those who should properly bear its burden.
Jury need not be instructedas to the tax-exempt status of personalinjury awards.
Damages awarded in personal injury actions are exempt from
both federal 23 9 and New York State income taxation.2 40 Whether a
jury should be informed of this fact has presented considerable
difficulty for the courts. Recently, in Coleman v. New York City
Transit Authority,2 4 1 the Court of Appeals, following the view of a
majority ofjurisdictions,24 2 held that a trial judge is not required to
234

Cf, e.g., Minoletti v. Sabini, 27 Cal. App. 3d 321, 103 Cal. Rptr. 528 (1972); Cappaa v.
Oscar C. Holmes, Inc., 25 Cal. App. 3d 978, 102 Cal. Rptr. 207 (1972); Fitch v. LeBeau, I
Cal. App. 3d 320, 81 Cal. Rptr. 722 (1969).
235 Hughes, supra note 224, at 684.
236 25 VAND.

L. REv. 623, 637 (1972). See also 44 N.Y.U.L. REV. 426, 432 (1969).
237 Smith v. Arbaugh's Restaurant, Inc., 469 F.2d 97, 106 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied,

412 U.S. 939 (1973).
238Hughes, supra note 224, at 691.
239 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 104(a).
240 N.Y. TAx LAW § 359(2)(e) (McKinney

1975).

24! 37 N.Y.2d 137, 332 N.E.2d 850, 371 N.Y.S.2d 663 (1975).
242 The majority of state and federal jurisdictions clearly prohibit any instruction to the
jury on the tax-exempt status of personal injury awards. See, e.g., Prudential Ins. Co. of
America v. Wilkerson, 327 F.2d 997 (5th Cir. 1964) (per curiam); Gerham v. Farmington
Motor Inn, Inc., 159 Conn. 576, 271 A.2d 94 (1970); Hall v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 5 Ill.
2d
135, 125 N.E.2d 77 (1955). Some jurisdictions, however, have adopted the contrary position,

